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Redrafting Municipal Housing Codes
BARLOW BURKE, JR.*

Housing codes create several types of expectations for
some interest groups in our cities today. Tenants expect their
housing to be put into decent, sanitaryshape. Officials expect
to be relieved of the pressure of citizen complaints by referring
people to the code enforcers. Construction people expect
specifications in the codes to create work. So it goes. And it is
not too much of an exaggeration to say that some landlords
expect to be put out of business by the codes. Recent litigation
has fulfilled some of the tenants' hopes and probably some of
the landlords' fears. Thus the system of rights and remedies
which codes create should be consideredanew.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Reformers and muckrakers have long attacked poor housing as one
of the worst problems of our cities.' Slums have long been seen as
"breeders" of ill-health and disorderliness. Some of this concern
doubtless is a mistaking of the symptom for the disease. Housing is the
most obvious feature of our cities. Highly visible, durable, and costly to
demolish, it is the scene of many social problems. It is perhaps natural to
mistake the scene for the problem.
But poor diet might as easily explain ill-health. Drug addiction and
2
an unstable family structure are likely causes of poor house-keeping.
Yet, at the same time that city officials have come to realize that housing
programs are only a partial solution to a larger problem of environment,
city councils have persisted in enacting many different types of housing
codes: structural, fire, sanitary, health, and electrical codes are the most
common. Often each is enforced by a different agency. Laws have been
piled on laws: each generation over the past 100 years in New York City,
3
for example, has seen a different city code enacted.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington College of Law American University: A.B.,
Harvard College (1963); LL.B., University of Pennsylvania (1966); M.C.P., University of
Pennsylvania (1968); LL.M., Yale University (1970). Member of the Pennsylvania Bar.
i. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING, Chap. 2 (1968), chronicles this concern
with particular reference to N.Y.C.; Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes, and the
Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO L. REV. 180 (1965), does
the same for Chicago.
2. See SHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY, Social Security Administration,
Washington, D.C. (1965), examines the correlation between social problems and housing in many
more aspects than are here enumerated.
3. Castraturo, Housing Code Enforcement: A Century of Failure in New York City, 14
N.Y.L.F. 60 (1968) at 62.

JOURNAL OF URBAN LAW

[Vol. 48: 933

Currently codes seem to be creating more problems than they
alleviate. They are proving cumbersome to administer. Dwelling units
outnumber inspectors on a ratio of 20,000 to 1.1 Most enforcement is
complaint-initiated, slow, and involves the delegation of large amounts
of discretion to housing inspectors. 5
Enforcement is also, perhaps as a result of the situation just
described, selective.' Nominally applicable to an entire urban
jurisdiction, codes are used only in certain areas of our cities.
Enforcement is selective for many reasons, but generally which housing
is chosen for enforcement depends upon the type of ownership, the
preferences of enforcement personnel, and the economics of the housing
market.
First, codes are most likely to be enforced against landlords and not
against owner-occupants. The reason is that, lacking an adequate budget
and numbers of inspectors, most code administrators do little more than
work on a complaint-initiated system of enforcement. Of course, tenants
are more likely to complain than are householders. 7 Area inspections are
not unknown, but they are not the usual practice."
Second come the preferences and predilections of the enforcement
officials.' Housing code offices have seldom gotten the best of the talent
available to local government. 0 The role of the office, understaffed or
not, is viewed in several ways, depending on the professional attitudes of
the incumbents. Some see their job primarily as the improvement of the
housing stock. Others feel that they are supposed to be bringing the
worst landlords "to justice"-after all, they are in many cities
administering codes with criminal sanctions. Their emphasis is on those
who exploit their tenants, collecting rent and not providing them with
proper consideration for value received. This type of administrator is
4. This figure represents the author's computation based on statistics for cities like Cleveland
and New Orleans. For larger cities, like N.Y.C., the ratio is probably higher.
5. See Note, Enforcement of Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L. REv. 801,806-7, for a description
of the complaint process.
6. Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. REv. 515 (1956).
7. Here I am referring to a complaint made to government, not just a propensity to complain
to the janitor or the landlord. Upper and moderate income tenants are just as likely to complain if
dissatisfied with housing conditions, but, having more bargaining power with their landlords and
perhaps greater skill at complaining effectively, they are more likely to have to go no further. Their
landlord is more likely to be in a position to afford the requested repairs, too. Lower class and
income tenants are more likely, because of the reverse of all these factors, to have to take the next
step and complain to government.
8. Of area inspections, more infra.
9. By preferences, I mean the propensity of an inspector to-look for a given type of violation.
For example, an inspector with experience in plumbing would notice violations of the sanitary code
before other types of violations. A mason is similarly more likely to notice defects in a stone or brick
wall. And so on. By predilections, I mean the inspector's view of his job, and it is with that aspect
this paragraph is mainly concerned.
10. Perhaps the streets department is consistently less fortunate in this regard.
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concerned with the mens rea of the landlord. He has usually all but
forgotten about the standards of the code, which talk exclusively about
the condition of the housing, not the intentions of the landlord. Still
other enforcers are inclined to see the codes as viable tools only in certain
areas of their city." These are the so-called "gray areas", deteriorating
or transitional zones, but not yet slums.
A third general problem of enforcement involves the economics of
the housing market.' 2 In many of our larger cities today, the vacancy
rate is very low.' 3 Public programs, like urban renewal, have cleared
densely populated land and intensified the need for housing. The private
construction industry either cannot meet this demand or finance its
projects in the present high-interest, capital market. Rising land,
materials, and maintenance costs make every aspect of rental development less profitable. Rent control, where in force, further limits
profits for rentable premises. Slum housing in particular is much less
profitable than it formerly was. Code enforcement, increased property
taxes, complaining tenants, rent withholding and strikes, and falling
resale prices are some of the reasons for this. 4 Indeed, many slum
buildings are being abandoned because of this profit squeeze.' 5 Not even
non-profit corporations can run slum housing effectively today.
Increasing numbers of buildings are being abandoned by their owners. '
Over the past two years, owners have walked away from some 30,000
buildings in New York City. 17 Thereafter, their physical deterioration is
even more rapid. Eventually the city becomes the landlord or the
building is vacated. New York City has thus become the unwilling
landlord of some 77,000 people in 1968-70.' 8 This process only tightens
the local housing market.
On the other hand, where the landlord agrees to improve the
condition of his housing, he is eventually forced to accept less profits
1I.
12.

This third view if often held by city planners.
In this regard, it is generally assumed that codes are required where, for various ill-defined

reasons, the market fails to provide decent premises. Thus codes are needed to repair flaws in the
market system, and the market itself is deemed socially useful when thus "corrected". GALBRAITH,
THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 366 (Signet Books Edition 1968). Edward C. Banfield provides the
antidote for this notion: he says that it is the market itself that provides poor housing, and that the
market for slum housing exists because of a demand for it. BANFIELD, THE UNHEAVENLY CITY, 4244 (1970).
13. Less than 1.0% in New York City. Television interview with Benjamin Altmann, N.Y.C.
Commission of Real Estate, on WCBS Radio Program, Let's FindOut, March 12, 1970.
14. DAHL, A WHITE SLUMLORD CONFESSES, reprinted in LEFCOE, LAND FINANCE LAW, 3

(1969).
15. See The Wildfire ofAbandonment, BusINESS WEEK (April 4, 1970) 88-90.
16. Id. All large United States cities are experiencing this situation.
17. This estimate is probably conservative. See note 15 and see Shipler, Experts Attribute
Housing Decay Here to Landlords' Fearsand Fantasiesas Well as Economic Realities, NEW YORK
TIMEs (March 22, 1970), 69, col. I.
18. Id.

JOURNAL OF URBAN LAW

[Vol. 48: 933

'until his margin is too low; then he feels compelled to raise rents. Thus is
the housing priced out of the range of low-income groups who are then
forced to find other accomodations.19

II.

THE ORIGINS OF CODES

The legal basis of housing codes lies in a concept of the police power
that has two aspects: (1) a regard for the effects of poor housing on the
surrounding neighborhood and (2) a concern for the lives of the tenants
in poor quality housing.20 The latter has been briefly discussed, but it is
the first purpose of these codes that is emphasized here. This emphasis is
areal, and the aim is to alleviate the burden of social costs or the
externalities of poor housing. Codes were originally aimed at selected
areas of our cities. 21 Only later did they apply to an entire city. The
danger of fires spreading from a poorly-built dwelling to the surrounding
community justified structural requirements. The fear of a
communicable disease sweeping through densely populated
neighborhoods justified health and sanitary districts in which the
number of occupants per dwelling unit was limited. These were 19th
century attempts to deal with the housing problems of the "ghetto"
areas of our cities.
So codes have two justifications: the welfare of the occupants and a
community-regarding concern for the third-party effects of poor housing
and crowding living. But the initial, areal aspect of codes continues to
this day.
In 1954, the "workable program" requirements for Urban
Renewal stated, inter alia, that the community receiving renewal grants
draw up a housing code.2 Some 1200 codes were enacted as a result of
this encouragement.2 3 The Federal government wanted to insure that
localities had the means to preserve the condition of housing adjacent to
Renewal projects. 24 Grants were made available to finance code
enforcement programs in such contiguous areas. These program
requirements were later liberalized to permit programs in areas
19.

Id.

20.

FRIEDMAN,

supra note 1. Another way of saying that codes express a concern for the

tenants in substandard housing is to read them as a means of shifting the duty to repair from tenant
to landlord. E.g., Walsh, Slum Housing: The LegalRemediesfor Connecticut Townas and Tenants,
40 CONN. BAR J. 539 (1966). See also Note, Private Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Regulations, 54 IA. L. REv. 581 (1966).
21. See Castaraturo, supra note 3; Note, Buildingand Housing Code.. " 31 U. CHIC. L.
REv., supra note 1.
22. Note, FederalAidfor Enforcement of Housing Codes, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 948 (1965).

23.

MANDELIKR, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT

24.

42 U.S.C. § 1451 (c).

655-685 (1966).
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unattached to Renewal projects2 5 Eventually, different code enforcement
standards were required by the Federal government in different areas of
our cities, depending on how these areas fitted into the locality's Urban
Renewal plan. There were different standards for demolition,
2
conservation, and maintenance areas.
Federal funds induced many local officials to undertake areainspections to enforce the codes on a comprehensive basis.27 By and
large, these inspections produced enforcement statistics which made the
administrators "look good". 2 8 But problems arose as well.
Since housing is an unstandardized product, equal enforcement is

very difficult if not impossible. Often what is looked for depends on the
particular inspector involved. This quickly becomes apparent in any

area-wide inspection. Such enforcement also makes more obvious some
of the implicit uses of codes. They can be utilized to: (1) drive down the
price of land and improvements soon to be condemned under the city's
eminent domain power, (2) drive the worst slumlords out of business, (3)

improve the tax base incrementally, and (4) provide a cheap substitute
29
for Urban Renewal.
Law Reviews have dealt feebly with the inadequacies of codes as
social policy tools. After 1954, many proposals for amending codes were
made. Their purpose was to improve enforcement, which, from the
beginning, appeared lax.
The first reforms aimed at improving judicial enforcement. The

suggestions might have been equally applicable to any use of judicial
process. A recitation of some of the enforcement problems will illustrate
this.30
(1)

Because many codes imposed criminal sanctions, personal

25. 42 U.S.C. § 1460 (c), discussed in Note, Federal Aid for Enforcement of Housing Codes,
40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 948, 971-974.
26. Id. at 971-74.
27. The compact areal basis of the program is stressed. See HUD, Code Enforcement Grant
Program Handbook, RHA 7250.1, ch. 1, p. 1; ch. 2, p. 6. Funds are to provide code enforcement
over a "normal" local level.
28. Note, Enforcement of New Orleans Housing Code, 42 TUL. L. REv. 604 (1968), reports
that, in that city, 23,000 of the 26,000 dwelling units inspected between 1954 and 1967 were
inspected during area-wide campaigns.
29. The effects of the announcement that an area is going to be replanned is known as
"planning blight", so far it has gone unrecognized in condemnation awards, although damages
have been sought on several occasions. ABRAMs, THE CITY IS THE FRONTIER, 133, 144 (1965), gives
some picture of this blight. On the second use, see LEFCOE, LAND FINANCE LAw 3-18 (1969). That
use of an attached code program funded with federal money is a substitute for urban renewal can be
shown by a perusal of the Federal Regulations governing such projects. Receipt of these funds, in
the case of the 1965 program, bars the locality from getting urban renewal funds for the same area.
See § 311, 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act (P.L. 89-117) (which forbids any overlap
between title I urban renewal and code projects). The jargon of all of these implicit uses is spelled
out in Reath, Housing Law Enforcement: Its Role in Urban Renewal, 23 SHINGLE 86 (1960).
30. Good summary discussions of these problems are contained in: Castraturo, supra note 3;
Note, Private Enforcement of Municipal Housing Regulations, 54 IA. L. REv. 580 (1966).
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jurisdiction over defendants was necessary, and hard to get.
Also, the state's burden of proof in such cases tended to be
higher. In effect, many judges required the state to prove mens
rea. Malum in se, rather than malum prohibitum, standards
were used. Judges also tended to postpone sentencing until
subsequent compliance mooted the case.
(2) Fines were small when finally imposed.
(3) These proceedings tended to involve two parties: the
landlord and the code authorities. The tenant was regularly left
out.
(4) A lack of money, administrative machinery, and

personnel was (and is) omnipresent. Inspectors, for example,
cannot be on the job and testifying in court at the same time.

(5) In toto, the process was too time-consuming.
For these problems, civil per diem fines were proposed, 31 enforced in a
special housing court. 2 Cities gradually increased the number of
inspectors and instituted new programs.33 Receiverships for slum
building were created. Repair-and-deduct laws allowed tenants to
correct sub-standard conditions with what would otherwise be rent-

money; sometimes rent abatement was permitted in order to create an
escrow fund for eventual repairs. In some instances, repair crews were
city personnel or were paid with city funds. The jurisdiction later sought
repayment from the landlord. OEO and Model Cities' programs often
employed target neighborhood residents as enforcement aides to ferret
out violations and investigate complaints.
Other problems remained.

(6) Inspection warrants were necessary in some instances for
the inspector to gain entry.
34
(7)

Corrupt officials prevented comprehensive enforcement.

31. Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1254 (1966) (the
fullest statement which puts the problem in these procedural terms).
32. Note, Enforcement of Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801, 818 (1965); Code Notes:
Housing Court Established in Cleveland, J. HOUSING (November 1969), p. 621; Comary, City of
Pittsburgh Housing Court, 30 U. PrrT. L. REv. 459 (1969).
Another component of the enforcement system seldom considered in the landlords or owner's
terms is the courtroom. Several cities - Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Cleveland, and Washington, D.C.,
to name a few-have housing courts, to which OEO-funded counsel can bring a tenant's case. The
judge here supposedly has a familiarity with housing policy, but this is not substitute for competent
and enthusiastic counsel for the owner or landlord involved. Indeed, many landlords may qualify for
OEO-counsel by their lack of income. Currently, landlords' counsel are no match for tenants' legal
services attorneys. Housing courts should be careful that they are not driving landlords out of
business.
33. Grad, Legal Remedies for Housing Code Violation, Reserach Report 14, The Nat.
Commission on Urban Problems, Washington, D.C. (1968), discusses all of the programs
mentioned in this paragraph. See also, Dept. of Buildings of N.Y.C., A Program for Housing
Maintenance and Emergency Repairs, 42 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 165 (1967).
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Another idea threading its way through all these reform proposals is
the idea of zoned codes. It was proposed first by local officials and later
advocated in a 1955 speech by William Slayton, then Urban Renewal
Administrator. But the Law Reviews early picked up and extolled it.
Basically the idea was that, since city-wide codes were proving
unenforceable for various reasons, the city should be divided into several
code enforcement areas. To each a different code would apply. It might
be well to examine this idea-its content and feasibility-in detail before
proceeding to other, newer suggestions. Its history will provide some
insight into the inadequacies of past efforts at code reform.3
III.

LAW REVIEW COMMENT ON ZONED CODES

In 1956, a Harvard Law Review Note suggested that zoned codes be
adopted for 3 different kinds of areas: (1) demolition-redevelopment
areas, where standards after demolition would be high in order to
preserve the pristine condition of the structures. (2) rehabilitation areas,
in which selective demolition and rehabilitation would attempt to
preserve the neighborhood and (3) maintenance areas, in which code
conformance was wide-spread and existing conditions have merely to be
maintained. The implication of all this is that maintainence of existing
property values is the purpose of codes. Another implicit suggestion is
that different codes should apply to different areas, depending on the age
and life of the buildings found in each.
This may work well when the various codes with differing standards
are applied to land-areas recently the beneficiary of replanning or
Federal aid. Thus redevelopment and conservation areas, both with
basically one type of structure of the same age, can be distinguished
from the rest of a city. But when a whole city is "zoned" for housing
code purposes, neighborhoods defined by the age and life-span of its
structures may be harder to define geographically.
Another notion is clearly needed. To understand this need, one must
step several paces back and, in a detached way, reexamine the proposed
three-tiered codes. What was intended? All of the proposals are meant to
set housing standards after the city has been replanned. This, however,
never happens all at once. The process can take years, even decades.
What about standards in the interim? Another note suggests that the
34. Supra note 30.
35. The following section is based on the author's interpretation of the idea of "zoned codes"
in law reviews. The chronology of this idea can be found in the following articles: Note, Municipal
Housing Code, 69 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1956); Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes, and the
Conservation of Chicago Housing Supply, 31 U. CHIC. L. REV. 180, 200-203; Warren,
Conservation and Rehabilitation of Housing, 63 MICH. L. REV. 892, 894-896, 901-902 (1965);
Note, Enforcement of Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. REv. 801 (1965).

JOURNAL OF URBAN LAW

[Val. 48: 933

longer the time until replanning or demolition, the more severe the
applicable code should be.
If the idea is "time to demolition," an underlying rationale is
relatively easy to find. An owner who is shortly to have his structure
demolished should not be forced to invest in it. Indeed, the interests of
the city in a later eminent domain proceeding may not be served if he is
forced to do so: the "just compensation" value will only rise as a result.
This rationale can be broadened if, for the idea of "time to
demolition", is substituted that of "time to replanning". The latter can
apply to any area of a city. The assumption here is that, at some future
time, the replanning of a neighborhood will increase land values. Then
each landlord and owner should be compelled to bring the condition of
his structure up to a level equalling his neighbor's. Uniform treatment
would be the goal, but on an areal or neighborhood basis. (Mortgage
bankers will testify that location is a major determinant of housing
value.)
Thus minimal standards would apply to areas about to be
demolished; standards would be higher in neighborhoods further away
from their rendezvous with replanning, and highest in those areas just
replanned or developed.
The zoned code resolves the dilemma posed by the attempt
(using a single code) to set minimal . . . standards for the
protection of the poor while at the same time setting high
standards for urban renewal areas. The resolution is to have
different codes for different areas. 31 U. Chic. L. Rev. 180,
200 (1963).
Placing redeveloped areas under the strictest standards may be
unrealistic, but presumably the planning commission should decide how
the city should be zoned.
IV.

Is ZONING REALISTIC?

Many urbanologists argue that our cities have grown in successive
concentric rings around a downtown area.36 This historic pattern might
provide a basis for isolating neighborhoods which were developed all at
once over a contiguous and discrete land-area. Land left vacant is filled
in later, often with commercial uses or apartments. If this is so, a city
would be relatively easy to zone for codes. Unfortunately, this pattern is
by no means omnipresent.
Where the pattern is not prevalent, ether approaches are available.
In a racial slum or ethnic neighborhood, it may well be that a contiguous
36. See BROWN, ROBERT KEVIN, ESSENTIALS OF REAL ESTATE, chap. 2 (1970).
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land-area also defines a housing market. Other markets are less easy to
locate geographically. For example, the market in housing for the elderly
might be circumscribed by such factors as the proximity of mass transit
in conjunction with shopping areas.
Whatever the difficulties of defining a housing market, it can be
reasonably argued that when the law commentators argued for zoned
codes, they really meant a series of codes, each applicable to a given
housing market. Thus broadened, the concept of "different codes for
different areas" can better encompass the unstandardized, mixed-use
neighborhood.
More.specifically, Charles Abrams has argued that strict code
37
enforcement tends to drive out the "first generation" of slumlords.
Speculators buy their properties. Financially, this second generation is
characterized by a lower equity interest in the property. As the equity in
the property decreases, the owner will be less likely (and has less
incentive) to comply with the code. Eventually, this process leads to
abandonment. So buyers might be classified according to their equity
interests. 38 Sellers can similarly be classified by their probable capital
gain upon resale. Together, the size of equity requirements for buyers
and capital gains for sellers constitute the parameters of every housing
market. So considerable research on market areas would be required
before a zoned code would become feasible.
One further distinction may prove useful. That is, in the present
tight mortgage market, there may be a class of landlord-owner who is
locked into his holdings because no speculator can get a mortgage to
take it off his hands.
V.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF ZONED CODES

Regardless of whether zoned codes can be made to reflect housing
markets, zoned codes may increase efficient administration to the extent
that area inspections are also encouraged. Indeed, areal inspections,
done door-to-door, often improve the enforcement record of the code
agency. It is often argued that they do several more things, like reducing
any later need for land clearance on an area-wide scale, reducing repair
costs by detecting violations early, and ultimately, reducing the number
of individually-initiated complaints. All of these benefits are empirically
unproven. Law reviews merely assert them.
The prime advantage or areal inspections is an increase in the
number of inspections per hour. This is better resource allocation, the
advocates say. If the number of violations were randomly distributed
37.
38.

ABRAMS, Tim CITY IS THE FRONTIER, 52 (1965).
Dept. of Building of City of New York, supra note 33, at 169.
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over all inspection areas, then the number of violations found would
indeed rise. Without this condition, however, there is no guarantee that
areal inspections will increase the number of violations found.
Moreover, problems of area selection would remain and undoubtedly
increase over time.
Another advantage possibly connected to areal inspections is a
saving of inspector's time in court. One inspector could have all of his
area's cases called for the same day, and thus reduce the initial time he
would have to wait in the courtroom. Time saving could result if
landlords' properties are concentrated in one inspection area so that one
inspector can deal with all the properties of one owner without
researching all of one's holdings. Court-time would not be taken up with
violations alone, but with the multiple violations of particular persons. A
consolidation of complaints could result-one inspector could have all
of one landlord's cases called on the same day, and so reduce the number
of appearances that both would otherwise have to make in court.
Area inspections do have a third advantage in providing more
uniform treatment of a nighborhood. This is in one sense a normative
value benefitting owners. Judges in housing or general jurisdiction courts
could familiarize themselves with the housing problems of an area.
Dealing with the case's generated by such inspections in sequence would
assure at minimum a uniformly applied judicial bias.
Area inspections might also have a political impact. Slum dwellers
know of the unequal treatment which a complaint-initiated system
produces.3 9 Area inspections would give code enforcement a great
visibility. However, this might also be counterproductive, in that
inspectors might be hounded on their rounds by complaining tenants and
might, as a result, actually see very little.
So some of these advantages are highly contingent. Achieving the
benefits of areal inspections now obviously depends on a reorganization
of several components of the legal system: the inspectors, judges,
procedures used in administration, follow-up enforcement, etc. What we
can learn from exploring the idea of new types of codes is that it will take
more than codes alone to do the job. Other local, state, and even national
policies are involved as well, and must be coordinated into any workable
solution.
VI.

A PROPOSAL

What past attempts to redraft codes have failed to identify is their
effect on housing markets.
39. REPORT
N.Y.C. 472 (1968).

OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,

N.Y. Times Edition,
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This is now being done, however, in the case of some other public
programs-rent control, for instance. The recent Niebanck Report on
Rental Housing in New York City concluded that the rent-controlled
market and the poorest quality housing were currently found to be in the
closest correlation. 40 Rent control had, over the years, produced
problems that now delimited an identifiable housing market, just as
location, structure type, and rent level did. George Sternlieb, another
recent student of New York City, found that the administrative
problems of code enforcement and rent control were much the same. 41 In
this latter study, one problem was to predict the landlord's costs. This is
42
a problem of both rent control and code enforcement.
What does all this mean? Among other things, it indicates that,
where rent control has been operative for some years, the problems
created become headaches for code enforcement officials as well. Not in
a cause and effect relationship necessarily, but interrelated still.
The situations which give rise to these two programs can be very
different. Poor quality housing and a short supply need not go together
under any iron law of economics. Indeed, a housing shortage may spur
excellent maintenance in the face of a profitable and competitive usedhousing market. Although, independent political considerations often
give rise to a clamor for rent control (tenant voters being more numerous
than objecting landlords in a jurisdiction); Boston, Cambridge,
Massachusetts and Akron, Ohio have recently debated the issue in their
councilmanic chambers. Boston instituted rent control. Adoption in
each case may be unwise, but the debates only underscore the danger of
ignoring or imprecisely defining the impact of economics on a housing
market. They show that if code enforcement fails, a city council may be
induced to institute a more drastic program, like rent control.
40. Niebanck, Rent Control and the Rental Housing Market in New York City 1968,
Housing and Development Administration of the City of New York, Department of Rent and

Housing Maintenance, unpublished monograph (January 1970), p. xvi: "While differentiation can
be made on many grounds, e.g., location, structure type or level of rent, the most useful basic

classification is control status itself."
Controlled units constitute over one-half of the units in the city's stock: 83% rent from $40-125
per month; 70% are located in structures containing between 3 and 49 units. Id. at xvi-xvii.
Decontrolled and never controlled units, on the other hand, tend to be in quite large structures, with
rents averaging S80-150 and $150-2-per month respectively. Id., at xviii. In the decontrolled
sector, 70% of the housing units are in one and two family houses. Id. at xvii. Never controlled units
contain, two-thirds of the time, more than 50 units, Id. at xviii. While the size of the unit does not
vary much between the three categories, the quality of the housing provided in each does: high
quality units are much more frequent in the decontrolled and never controlled structures. Id. at xxviXXX.
41. Sternlieb, The Urban Housing Dilemma, Housing and Development Administration of
the City of New York, Department of Rent and Housing Maintenance (unpublished prelim. draft,
undated).
42. Id. at Appendix 8-1, p.465.
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There are points at which code enforcement programs dovetail-for
good or ill-with other governmental programs. Relocation housing for
urban renewal can often become the focus of code enforcement
attention, and the result can be a decrease in the supply of housing
available to displaced people. Federal programs, as we have seen, do
encourage code enforcement programs around urban renewal projects.
When program is piled on program, often each will compound the
problems of the others. Studies of New York City now provide sorry
testimony of this.
So a realistic statement of the issue is to ask whether code
enforcement should be deliberately made a part of a larger urban
program-or whether it needs its own rules and rationale. It has too
often been the handmaiden of other programs and interests. Housing
officials can often find as many as 1000 violations in one structure.4 3 In
such situations, using codes is like hunting an elephant armed with
grapeshot. The need for a new approach is increasingly apparent as
housing conditions worsen. Codes have been-in effect-indirect
subsidies to tenants at landlord's expense. They have shifted the burden
of repairing the premises from tenant to landlord and in many cases have
driven landlords out of business. They are, therefore, removing housing
from what would otherwise be a viable market. So any further redrafting
should speak to the problem of abandonments and other destructive
effects on this market.
Similarly, a redrafting should not merely aim at providing better
enforcement. Past attempts have achieved no significant impact on
complaint procedures. A different approach is required. Enforcement
should be made self-starting. Owners and landlords should be provided
with incentives to comply with the codes.
Another program need is to consider all aspects of the enforcement
system. Substantive law, embodied in the standards that the codes
prescribe for housing, is only one of these. Procedural rules, enforcement
personnel, organizations, resource allocation decisions, and habits of
mind constitute the other aspects that should be covered. A failure to
deal with any one of these aspects could nullify the impact of a change in
any single component.
The concept of "zoned codes", proposed only in law reviews in a
general way to date, might be modified, developed, and adopted into a
code based on "market zones". Each zone would then be a contiguous
43. E.g., McLaughlin, 8,360 Violations Laid to Landlord, WASHINGTON POST (October 24,
1970), BI.
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land area, a neighborhood built as a unit, or a discrete housing market.
Each market could be ascertained by reference to the following data:
a. recent sales: downpayment rates and capital gains
b. built-up equity in a market: length of tenure might be used
as rough guide
c. frequency of sales
d. in-and-out migration
There are two ways to put this proposal into operation. They are
not necessarily mutually exclusive. As a first step, all code standards for
each zone or market should be dropped to a minimum level and regarded
thereafter as a floor on housing standards. Then standards should be
raised in quantum jumps. Types of "amenities" would form each
quantum of improvements, falling into four categories:
(a) structural
(b) infrastructural
(c) sealing the shell
(d) cosmetic
Housing codes were originally devised to control the living
conditions presented by urban housing. Since present codes often lose
sight of these conditions of habitability in more technical considerations
of materials and performance standards, this proposal allows a more
functional definition of a code violation. Such a re-definition has
recently taken place in New Jersey: there, ". . . each housing unit, or
the building's common areas or supporting systems, can be liable for
citation as in violation because of specific conditions found. * * * The
concept of 'violation' is thus refined under this new system as the result
of conditions which affect the functional ability of housing to serve its
purpose . . .-4 In an effort to keep landlords in business and
performing a social function at the same time, they should be cited for
one type of violation, as proposed above, at a time, beginning with the
types most basic to the skeletal structure of the building.
This proposal also presents an opportunity to take account of a
second factor. That is, housing is and has always been built by those who
can afford it. This means that new construction is intended for the
wealthy. Currently, it is out of the reach of one-half of all the families in
this country. First owners, however, eventually move on to other
housing, and their homes filter down to lower income groups, finally to
poverty groups. Codes, however, tend not to reflect this trickle-down
effect. The same materials are still specified. To reflect the needs and
44.

Amer. Soc. Planning Officials, Code Violation Redefined, 36 PLANNING 134 (1970).
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finances of the new occupants, they should allow for the elimination of
luxuries, the use of cheaper building materials, and the phasing-out of
some non-structural features of the dwelling. Porches, ornate facades,
shingled roofs, etc., would thus gradually be dismantled. Owners and
landlords could convert their premises to less costly, easily maintainable
dwellings using Code-approved materials.
Any owner or landlord would have to improve his premises in the
most basic category before he would go into the next type. For any
improvements made he could raise his rents ratably. This may prove to
be a complex administrative problem -something like rent control.45 To
eliminate some of the problems the landlord might be allowed to assess
tenants extra charges for the improvements. These could be paid
separately from rent and not controlled by the lease. They would be like
"mortgage .points". Or, as an alternative, his tax assessment might be
ratably reduced for a stated period, preferably 3-5 years. This constitutes
an indirect subsidy, whereas rent increases are a direct one.
As a second step, a landlord should have, as a defense to a formal
charge or administrative allegation of a code violation, that he is not
making a profit 4 customary in his market, or that, in the alternative, he
needs to retain his profits to make code improvements.
Taken together, these two suggestions constitute a bonus or
incentive system, much used today in some zoning ordinances. The
second proposal operates as a limit upon the first. In that way, the tough
questions of defining a market by profitability are avoided, except as the
last resort.
This proposal has several definite advantages. It recognizes the
economic problems of landlords. It admits that codes are most likely to
be enforced where it is least feasible. It admits that, no matter what the
side-effects of bad housing, most tenants survive the experience and are
better left to it when the alternative seems to be less housing for their
income group. After a long period of experimentation showing, if
nothing else, that coerced enforcement is not feasible, it offers an
incentive to better maintenance. It allows enforcement to continue
without much increase in administrative personnel. Enforcement is made
self-starting to the extent the incentives work. Code violations and
improvements are dealt with in four categories; landlords need only deal
with one type of violation at a time. Thereafter, the owner should gain

45. This is a form of rent control, but differs from other forms in that landlords will be given
an incentive to repair their premises as they seek increased rents.
46. Profit should be defined, for this purpose, as a set ratio of net income to sales price.
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immunity from further inspections for several years. In effect, this has
always been the advantage of area inspections for landlords. Finally, all
of these proposals operate to bring the level of housing above a
minimum level, below which normal code procedures are to be
continued.
The disadvantages of this proposal are several, and at least suggest
the constraints under which the program will have to operate. First, the
proposal may seem to "institutionalize" low-income housing markets.
This charge is largely gainsaid by the proposal's emphasis on minimum
standards and amenity improvements. It cannot be emphasized too
much that this represents a shift of tactics, not less enforcement.
Further, a shift of tactics may be necessary to meet changing times.
Black communities today often see code enforcement officials as the
tools of established power, and, as officials work to renew the property
tax base of the center city, the charge is leveled that the aim is to make
housing more expensive, drive out the black population, and "restore"
whites in the neighborhood. 4 Area or market inspections, if properly
planned, could diminish both the shadow and the substance of such
charges.
Secondly, critics might say that the system will only produce sloppy
management and less maintenance and repair work. In effect, the
landlord will charge what the market will accept, and housing conditions
will decline. This charge can be met in several ways. Most importantly, it
is unlikely that tenants will remain passive to poor housing in the future.
On the contrary, they are likely to be even more vocal in airing their
grievances. Further, the landlords will have an incentive to raise housing
standards through tax reductions or rent increases. There may also be a
need for sheltering present income through further tax incentives, but, of
that, more later. Third, in a market in which eviction is becoming
harder, there is little chance that landlords will be able to squeeze tenants
any further. Indeed, they will have to live with them for longer terms.
Some people, however, may oppose the present plan for reasons
quite apart from its merits. Playing a form of "plague politics", they
may prefer to see the number of abandonments rise to such a level where
government will have to intervene with massive amounts of money. Their
theory would be that the worst crisis produces the best solution. Even
disregarding the dubiousness of this assumption, the argument is
answerable on its own terms. The present proposal provides subsidies to
landlords indirectly. That is, the subsidies come in a form that does not
require Congressional or legislative authorization, but creates
47. Rohrbach, The Poignant Dilemma of Neighborhood Restoration, CITY (AugustSeptember, 1970), p. 63, 66.
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investment incentives in the form of property tax breaks and a promise
of higher rental charges. This is money that the government never
collects but instead allows the taxpayer to keep for a civic purpose. This
approach worked well for industry as a Federal investment tax credit in
the -early 1960's. The resulting investment in capital plant produced the
largest annual increases ever in GNP. Indeed, the same device might now
be tried for the poverty-sector housing market. Such indirect subsidies
are an interim measure until direct ones are politically feasible. Critics
will say that such a market will not gear up for investment as quickly,
but that is speculative. The incentive is just as powerful, no matter what
the state of the industry.
Lawyers may oppose the present proposal thinking it an
unconstitutional treatment of owners and landlords. The equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
governmental actions be uniform for all citizens,4 8 except as the
legislature can reasonably conclude that groups of citizens can be
classified differently so as to achieve some over-all societal good. Thus,
all of our cities need not be demolished and redeveloped under urban
renewal programs, but "blighted" parts can be. All of our towns need
not be zoned alike, because separation and diversity of land-uses is
thought to benefit all. Zoned codes stand in the same light. Although
physically all housing starts out in a condition reflecting only the moneyinvestment in them their location and use, over time, in a particular
housing market soon distinguish one structure from another built at
an equivalent cost. There is no reason why a city should be zoned as a
unit for housing code purposes when different housing markets clearly
exist within it. Different markets can reasonably require different public
policies.4 9 The problem of abandoned ownership clearly demarcates one
market today. Since this normally leads to the further structural renewal
programs, but demolition as a public nuisance or costly public
ownership may be the result.50 To prevent this, some regulation is
48. "There has been a good deal of discussion regarding whether it would be lawful to create
a zoned housing code in which different parts of the city would be subject to different standards.
Because housing code in which different parts of the city would be subject to different standards.
Because housing codes deal with matters so directly related to public health and safety, there is an
argument that the same standards should be used throughout the entire municipality. This is
generally the case, but there is some pressure for zoned housing codes and they may become more
popular in the future. It is difficult to say whether it will be possible to devise valid criteria for
classifying different parts of the city for different housing standards." Bosselman, The Legal
Frameworkof Building and Housing Ordinances,4 THa BUILDING OFFICIAL, 10, 13 (March, 1970).
49. Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1956).
50. Ungar, City to Aid 28 Families in Tenement, WASHINGTON PosT (November 6, 1970),
Al, reporting that a federal court in the District of Columbia ordered the city to run an abandoned
apartment house with public funds at no expense to the tenants. See also Hudson, Mayor Urges a
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proposed. The milder remedy is necessary to prevent the more severe
one. 5
Further, equal protection problems arise when there are imposed on
one property owner greater burdens than are forced on his fellows. Thus,
if a housing code required plumbing only in apartments with more than
three rooms, the owner of the larger apartments could argue that the
legislature has created an unreasonable or invalid class of property
owners. It has been so argued, successfully too. 52 Similarly, where offstreet parking is required for apartments and not for hotels and rooming
houses, that is another unreasonable classification.5 In the proposal
outlined above, increased standards are not being imposed on any
owner, except in cases where an increased return accrues to the owner at
the same time. Thus many cases raising equal protection arguments can
be distinguished: no new burdens are being imposed on landlords by this
proposal; instead, its aim is to keep them in business.
There is no constitutional requirement that a state or local
jurisdiction must be dealt with under one Federal program. Why then
only one housing code? As to the charge that, in part, this proposal
represents a form of rent or profit control, the answer is that it does that
only incidentally, but that its major aim is to regulate competition
depriving tenants of decent housing. It rests on a well-established areal
concept of the police power. 4
Benjamin Altmann, the Rent Commissioner for New York City
recently said that the point of low profitability in rental housing is in the
20-50 unit project. Nearly all apartment houses this size are rent
controlled. Recent construction would not build so small a complex-it
would be unprofitable from the outset. Somewhere above this size, the
business of renting housing should become profitable enough to warrant
investment. Such a level of profitability should perhaps, in the future, be
Revision of the Abandoned Buildings Program, NEW YORK TiMEs (September 10, 1970), 40,
Simeon H. F. Goldstein, Letter to the Editor, NEW YORK Tim~s (September 25, 1970), 38 (both
containing views of the N.Y.C. situation). Abandonment may also be an opportunity for a
receivership on the tenant's behalf or the start of a home ownership program. Schreiberg,
Abandoned Buildings and the In Fill Program, 2 URBAN LAWYER 186 (1970); Dick and Pfarr,
Detroit Housing Code Enforcement and Community Renewal: A Study in Futility, 3 PRospacTus

61(1969).
51. Where preservation of property values is a valid legislative purpose for zoning, this
argument will be easy to make. See State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269
Wisc. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
52. Brennan v. City of Milwaukee, 265 Wisc. 52, 60 N.W.2d 704 (1953).
54. Neither is the concept of a "market" in a zoned code likely to be held void for vagueness.
Edgar A. Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegal, 253 U.S. 242 (1922), held constitutional a N.Y.C. rent control
ordinance which allowed, as a defense to a landlord's action for nonpayment of rent, a tenant's
showing that the rent charged was "unjust and unreasonable". Certainly the concepts of a market
or profitability are no vaguer.
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an aspect of building permit or subdivision hearings. So the proposal that
unprofitability be a defense for landlords can be reversed-and the same
idea, in the hands of public officials, might become a tool for guiding
future development. George Sternlieb shows quite neatly how to
calculate expenses; it can be done with little administrative trouble.5 To
such calculations would, however, have to be added requirements for
better technology that would decrease maintenance costs.
VII.

OTHER DIMENSIONS OF THE SOLUTION

This proposal represents, given the framework within which codes
exist, the best that can be devised. More innovative approaches are
necessary. One would be changing the Federal tax laws to allow
depreciable "tax shelters" for improvements made on slum properties.
There would of course be initial problems of defining an improvement
severable from the rest of the premises and assigning to it a depreciable
life. But these definitional problems are no more insuperable than the
questions raised and resolved by the Internal Revenue Service when
dealing with corporate taxpayers.
Similarly, landlords might be allowed to set aside some of their
profits as a bad debt reserve, with the stipulation that it be invested in the
property between tenancies in order to attract new leases. Any money
lost over and above this reserve through non-payment of rent also might
be deducted as a bad debt.
Another device for paying for code improvements is a lease. Repairs
could be made and initially paid for by the landlords. They would then
"lease" the improvement to the city in return for a rental over the life of
the improvement-a 3 to 5 year period, decided on primarily for
administrative convenience. Sale and leaseback arrangements might also
be used in basically the same way. Here the landlord pays the "rent" on
the improvement sold previously to the city to recoup the investment in
it. For him, the "rent" is a deductible business expense.
The city's expenses, in the foregoing schemes or when repairs are
borne directly, might be financed with bonds floated by local housing
authorities, under the Turnkey Public Housing Programs which could
then lease the improvement to the landlord at some fraction of its cost.
This proposal might be combined with the leasing devices discussed
previously.
Code improvements, whether financed with direct or indirect
subsidies, will be expensive. The problem is costly to society in any case,
especially if nothing is done.
55.

Sternlieb, supra note 41.
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CONCLUSION

The point here is that any solution to the problem of housing code
enforcement must take account of the whole economic and political
system that now generates realty investment. I have mentioned but a few
of the considerations. There are many more, involving several types of
insurance underwriting, liens, title insurance, etc. If the whole system
cannot be modified at once there is little sense in redrafting the codes,
which after all are only one part of it.
Today, codes achieve one of two things when they are enforced:
higher rents or abandonments. Neither helps the tenants of the affected
housing.
In this situation, and with systematic changes in the codes unlikely,
an alternative is the selective abolition of the codes in housing markets
where they only produce disastrous effects.
Opponents will say that this is not politically feasible. I am not
convinced of that. Leaders like Jesse Gray are continually charging that
there is collusion in New York City between the enforcement officials
and the city. In effect, he thinks that the officials are bribed to stay
away. He feels that there are underlying "policy reasons" for this.
Finding a violation might mean an eventual abandonment-neither the
city nor the landlord wants this, so their interests coalesce. The result is
little enforcement.
If the "amenity" codes were replaced in some housing markets with
other devices allowing landlord and tenant to bargain over better
conditions, then such suspicions would be met. The rhetoric of
"community control" could be mustered in support of this. (An
alternative is community endorsement of the code as is, but that would
really end the landlords' business.)
What I am really suggesting is a sort of NLRB type framework for
housing markets that do not produce good housing. This might not
produce better housing, but it would give the tenants a say in the qualitylevel finally achieved. A bargaining process between landlord and
enforcer is what normally takes place. The difference would be that now,
the tenant's voice would be heard. No increase in staff or budget would
be required. Tenants groups could not then be heard to complain that
they expect more of their landlords than they got. This result would be
achieved since the burden would be on the tenant groups to come forth
with negotiable proposals.
Paternalistic reformers might think that the poor should not be left
to poor housing and that we must "do something". This urge to do
something is primarily a problem of their own personalities. The poor
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should not be made to suffer for it. Currently, with higher rents and
abandonments the only real consequences of code enforcement, they are
indeed suffering.
With housing codes, law has been asked to do something which it
cannot do: to achieve better housing in the face of a difficult economic
situation for landlords, a tight money market for slum mortgages and
improvement loans, and rising expectations and demands of tenants. In
such a case, the proper role of the state may be to help the tenants
express their own desires.
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